This paper addresses the agenda for the Group of Twenty (G-20) leaders' meeting in Seoul, Korea in November 2010. This is an opportunity and challenge for Asian leaders in particular. Their test will be, first, to demonstrate that they can responsibly advance economic recovery. They must also deliver on institutional reform, in particular of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). I advocate a substantial expansion of the IMF's role as lender of last resort that is integrated with the surveillance role of the IMF in the form of comprehensive prequalification for IMF assistance and policy advice and a substantial increase in the IMF's financial resources. I also propose an approach to meaningful reform of the distribution of IMF quotas along with limiting European seats on the IMF executive board.
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IntroductIon And SummAry
The global economic and financial crisis of 2007-10 adversely, though differentially, impacted essentially every country in the world. The global effects were the consequence of the high degree of economic and financial integration that is a central characteristic of the 21st century economic and financial system. Spurred by technology, global integration will continue to increase. The logical conclusion is that the pattern of the recent crisis will be repeated though one hopes with less virulence.
Governments responded to the global crisis with an unprecedented demonstration of international policy coordination. Their principal mechanisms were the Group of Twenty (G-20) and the international financial institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the wake of the crisis, the central question for the international community is the future of these institutions. Will they be strengthened or set to one side pending the next crisis?
Because the G-20 and the IMF performed admirably in the crisis, support for them and their member governments should be high, but that is not the universal reality. In the aftermath of the crisis, public opinion has actively second-guessed the policy actions of many governments and intergovernmental institutions of economic and financial cooperation. Trust in governments has fallen, in many cases to new lows, and support for the international institutions has eroded as well. The resulting centrifugal forces make it increasingly difficult to mobilize public support for institutions of international cooperation.
The G-20 is one such institution. It is an ad hoc group. Even though it represents more than 60 percent of the world's population and more than 80 percent of the world's GDP, the G-20 is considered by many political leaders and observers to lack legitimacy because its membership is self-selected. Almost 2.5 billion people are unrepresented. Moreover, the G-20 is only one of many such ad hoc groups that operate at the global, regional, and subregional level.
Alongside these ad hoc groups are international financial institutions (IFIs) that also operate at the global, regional, and subregional level. They are more formally constituted. Partly as a consequence, in a changing global environment in which Asian countries have increasing relative economic and financial weight, their governance is on the agenda of many of the ad hoc groups as well as on the agendas of the institutions themselves.
The rapid expansion of many Asian economies over the past decade has been facilitated by their relative openness. 1 Two of its largest economies, China and the Republic of Korea, are particularly open for countries large in area and population with ratios of aggregate current account transactions to GDP of more than 70 percent. Consequently, Asia needs a healthy world economy and a system of economic governance that supports an open economy if Asia is to continue to prosper. Even those who advocate Asian triumphalism should worry about an Asia that turns inward and ignores the global dimension in its policies. Asian leaders should feel more threatened by the predominance of centrifugal forces, which threaten collective institutions, over centripetal forces, which strengthen those institutions.
On November 11-12, 2010, the G-20 leaders will meet for the first time in Asia. They have an opportunity to demonstrate their concrete support for the informal and formal international institutions of the global system. Asian leaders, in cooperation with leaders of other regions, have an overwhelming interest in doing so. Moreover, Asia (as defined in footnote 1) has six, or 30 percent, of the members of the G-20 and is well positioned to influence G-20 outcomes. To that end, this paper offers recommendations for Asian leaders and the G-20 in six key areas.
First, the G-20 should emphasize substance over form. With respect to substance, the G-20's overarching objective should be to strengthen existing institutions, not to supplant them. To date, the G-20 has a good record building on the expertise of the international organizations such as the IMF,
World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Financial
Stability Board (FSB) while stimulating and advancing a work program of global action and reform.
The risk is that countries-acting both individually and collectively in their regional and subregional groups-will fail to learn the central lesson of the crisis: all countries were adversely affected and a coordinated global response was required and forthcoming to maximize the positive effects and minimize free riding and negative spillovers. Therefore, global institutions, in particular, need to be strengthened and supported. It also follows from the scope of the recent crisis that global institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and those in the World Bank Group should have priority over regional and subregional institutions precisely because they are global in their orientation and activities.
For the immediate future, leaders of Asian countries have a special responsibility. Many in Asia and elsewhere agree with IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2010b): "Asia's time has come to play a leading role in the global economy," but many also agree with him that Asia's relationship with the rest of the world as well as with the IMF must be "two-way." With a greater voice comes greater responsibility. The Seoul G-20 summit provides the major Asian countries an opportunity to demonstrate their acceptance of this bargain not by promoting Asia but by enhancing international cooperation. This is particularly true with respect to the fifth recommendation below: concrete actions as part of the mutual assessment process supporting the G-20's framework for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.
Second, turning briefly to form, the countries in G-20 meetings should not institutionalize their gatherings and should resist an excessive expansion of their substantive engagement. The test for the G-20 leaders is whether their decisions and initiatives are, and are perceived by others to be, in the mutual 4 interests not only of the participating countries but also of the global economic and financial system as a whole. If the G-20 is to be successful as "the premier forum for our international economic cooperation," the emphasis should be on policy cooperation among the participants not on the policies of, or that principally affect, other countries. The emphasis should be on the "our" in the quoted statement from the Pittsburgh and Toronto G-20 meetings.
If the G-20 leaders cannot resist institutionalization and expanding their mandate, that decidedly second-best option should be accompanied by streamlining G-20 representation: the European Union countries should be limited to two seats (one for the euro area and one for the non-euro area), the remaining seats for leaders should be selected via constituencies, the total number of such seats should be fewer than 20, and representatives of international organizations should be observers with their participation focused on delivering reports and responding to requests rather than driving the agenda.
Third, with respect to IFI reform, and specifically IMF reform, which is on the Seoul agenda, the G-20 leaders must reach consensus on a number of key issues. Most important is the size of the overall increase in IMF quotas. The leaders in Seoul should endorse a doubling of quotas for the reasons advanced in the fourth recommendation below. Also important is reducing the representation of Europe on the IMF executive board from the current 8 to 10 chairs toward an ultimate target of two, or at most three, chairs.
Important but of less overall substantive consequence to IMF reform, in contrast with symbolism and G-20 credibility, is delivering on the Pittsburgh commitment "to a shift in quota share to dynamic emerging-market and developing countries of at least five percentage points from overrepresented to underrepresented countries." A crucial issue is the interpretation of this statement. It should be interpreted as requiring a shift of quota share away from the traditional advanced economies to the emerging-market and developing countries, in particular those that are most dynamic, and a simultaneous broader redistribution from overrepresented to underrepresented countries within both groups. A second crucial issue is the presumptive use and status of the IMF quota formula that was agreed upon in early 2008. As is explained below, the 2008 formula is deeply flawed. To achieve the Pittsburgh commitment, the 2008 formula would have to be overlaid with another set of ad hoc criteria undermining the transparency and credibility of the result. The best way to deal with this second issue would be to employ what in effect would be a revised new formula that could be blended with the 2008 formula to produce the agreed result. That approach should be accompanied by a commitment to phase out the flawed 2008 quota formula over time in favor of the revised new formula.
Of marginal importance would be a symbolic decision in Seoul to abandon the convention that the head of the IMF should be a European citizen and the head of the World Bank should be a US citizen.
The convention should and must be abandoned at the earliest opportunity, but those who want to force Fourth, as with the G-20 itself, the form of IFI governance is less important than the substance of the work of these institutions. The lesson of the global economic and financial crisis is that the IFIs, the IMF in particular, are essential to effective crisis management and to the limitation, or prevention, of crises. The world is not ready for a global central bank that can act as an international lender of last resort to the international financial system as whole, but the recent crisis has demonstrated that the IMF should be moved closer to this role.
Unfortunately, the leaders and citizens of some key countries do not agree with this proposition;
they articulate concerns about wasting taxpayers' money and combine those arguments with simplistic moral hazard concerns associated with IFI lending. All IFI lending activities involve a balance between the provisions of financial assistance on concessional terms and the promotion of policy reforms through programs or surveillance. Actual and potential financial assistance may contribute to moral hazard. The issue is whether the associated reforms are worth the risks. It is important to get this balance right, which has not recently been the case. For example, in January 2008, the IMF governors acquiesced in the judgment that the IMF did not need a general increase in quota resources. As the crisis was unfolding, the balance was tipped too far toward starving the IMF, and the other IFIs, of financial resources. As a consequence, the IFIs under G-20 leadership had to scramble during the crisis to assemble financial resources.
It is naïve to believe that there will not be other crises in the future. That is why it is essential that the Korean authorities succeed in their quest to strengthen the global financial safety net provided by the IMF and move the Fund closer to being an international lender of last resort. A crucial element of this package is to provide the IMF with sufficient financial resources to play this role, which is why doubling the size of the Fund-total IMF quotas-is so important as part of the Seoul package. But other mechanisms to mobilize IMF financing are also appropriate: special drawing rights (SDR) allocations and temporary swap arrangements with the central banks that issue international currencies.
An associated component to this reform of IMF lending should be to integrate better the IMF's surveillance role and its financing role. I propose a framework for such integration based on the IMF's Article IV consultation process: comprehensive prequalification. I propose that for every member of the Fund its Article IV review should include a staff judgment on the nature of the policy conditions, if
any, necessary to qualify that member for IMF financial assistance if needed. The G-20 in Seoul should endorse this augmentation of the safety net proposal. The related substantive issue is some countries' preference for self-insurance in the form of increases in reserves generated by current account surpluses rather than capital inflows. This preference, in the aggregate, tends to distort the international adjustment process; see the fifth recommendation below. In this connection, consideration should be given to regular issuance of SDR as long as member countries credibly commit to limiting their accumulations of reserves in other forms and their current account surpluses.
Fifth, the mutual assessment process in support of the G-20's framework for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth is closely related to the crisis prevention role of the IMF. Its success will depend crucially on whether the systemically important countries will discharge their responsibilities. The recent global economic and financial crisis was not triggered by a crisis of confidence in the US dollar or in US economic policies following the build-up of global imbalances in the middle of the past decade, but those risks remain.
It is essential that, as part of the mutual assessment process, the individual G-20 countries meeting in Seoul put on paper precise, new, numerical commitments as part of their comprehensive action plan to achieve an economic recovery and subsequent expansion that broadly benefit all stakeholders in the global system. If the leaders meeting in Seoul can do no more than repeat broad statements about reducing budget deficits and public debt levels, implementing structural reforms, and allowing greater exchange rate flexibility, they will have ducked their responsibility. In this connection, the leaders of the Asian countries, which are individually and collectively in the strongest position, but also are highly vulnerable to another systemic disruption, must take the lead in putting on the table concrete changes in policies.
For example, they should commit to numerical targets for their current account positions and announce specific measures to achieve those targets. The other G-20 countries should follow the Asians' lead.
2. This is the logic supporting the enlargement of the FSB and enhancing its role.
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Finally, when it comes to financial regulation and reform, there is a natural tendency for countries whose financial institutions were not major players in the recent financial meltdown to step aside, criticize those institutions and jurisdictions that were principally involved, and decline to participate in a strengthened regulatory and supervisory regime. That would be a mistake. Yesterday's cautious institutions can quickly become tomorrow's high fliers. Meanwhile, institutions in the major jurisdictions will use the very real threat of regulatory and institutional arbitrage to water down agreed reforms. This is why it is essential that the leaders of the Asian countries commit to implement conscientiously the reforms of the financial system that are emerging from the work of the Financial Stability Board and the new capital standards of Basel III.
At the same time, as part of a larger quid pro quo, the G-20 countries should commit themselves to a full-fledged examination of the issues associated with global capital flows, including the use of capital controls, with a view toward amending the IMF Articles of Agreement to update the framework governing the surveillance and lending activities of the Fund and to reinforce and clarify the role of the Fund in this area.
the chAllenge of globAl economIc governAnce
Global governance is a complex issue fraught with ambiguities and pitfalls. Global economic governance is no different.
The governance challenges for official institutions increase the further removed the institutions themselves are from those affected by their decisions. The further removed the governing body is, the easier it is to think of that body as a disembodied "they." Progressing from hamlets and communities to schools and towns, counties and states, and the nation state, the identification between the citizen and the perceived decision maker becomes more tenuous. Moving from governance of the nation state to governance at the subregional, the regional, and the global level, the connections are loosened further, I
would posit, by the square of the distance from the individual. What stake does the average resident of Seoul perceive that he has in the success or failure of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), the ADB, or the IMF?
Any international consensus among national representatives is at best loosely shared further along the domestic political chain. A shared vision is difficult to articulate and achieve, except under special conditions such as a global crisis. National representatives have every incentive to pursue narrow, short-term national interests. With two possible exceptions, rarely does a finance minister emerge from an international meeting saying "we have acted in good faith in the interests of the world as a whole."
Exception number one is when the finance minister has just been verbally bludgeoned into agreement by the overwhelming majority of peers. Exception number two is when there was no disagreement going into the meeting. Leaders may internalize collective success more, but they are even less likely to admit defeat. As a consequence of the crisis, in essentially every country, governments have lost respect and trust.
The natural tendency of elected officials and public servants working with them is to turn inward, to seek national rather than international solutions, and to hesitate to make new commitments that would benefit the world as a whole and their own countries as well. International institutions, formal and informal, were instrumental in limiting the depth of the crisis and ameliorating some of the most adverse externalities and consequences of the crisis for those countries that were unprepared or underprepared. Despite that fact, international institutions-subregional, regional, and global-are deeply at risk. This is because they, too, failed to see, or warn sufficiently of, the impending crisis.
During the crisis and its immediate aftermath, the leaders of each of the IFIs advanced bids for substantial additions to their basic capital resources. The IMF and the Asian Development Bank moved first, but the World Bank and each of the other regional development banks submitted requests as well. In each case, the initial response of member countries was positive, but progress on implementation has been slow. 5. In the first group, the two countries that have not acted are Ireland and Turkey. In the second group, the principal countries (based on share of regional voting power of more than 1 percent) are Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan.
n Consider delaying a G-20 commitment for capital increases for the multilateral development banks until it is clear that capital infusions are necessary, needed reforms are underway, and upcoming elections of leadership positions at some development banks are completed.
n To the extent possible [which I suspect is technically not possible], the administration should pursue temporary capital increases given that the impact of the global financial crisis will eventually wane.
n Consider [but not commit to] providing funds to clear United States' current arrears (unmet commitments) to the development banks, the existence of which undermines United States influence at these institutions. My inference from these facts is that support for IFIs and governance changes in IFIs is not very strong even on the part of those countries that are expected to benefit directly. Where the benefits are perceived as indirect such as the United States, the challenges are even greater.
I suspect that if international agreements that commit the taxpayers of countries to provide support to other countries via IFIs were submitted to referenda in the first group of countries, more often than not they would not pass. As evidence, note the delay in Switzerland's joining the IFIs. Note also the long-standing reluctance of the members of the European Union that see themselves as net creditors to support the establishment of a substantial pool of common fiscal resources, as well as the more recent backlash against using taxpayers resources to "bailout" the Greek government and its citizens from their fiscal and financial excesses and the delays in establishing the temporary European Financial Stability
Facility that would provide the financing for the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism that, in principle, would also involve IMF financing.
The politics and political economy of a few countries, most of which are found in Northern Europe, historically have been more supportive of foreign assistance in general and the international financial 6. As a citizen of the United States, I have long been deeply troubled by US arrears to IFIs. This is not a new phenomenon; it dates back at least to the late 1960s.
institutions in particular. 7 In July 2010, a majority of people polled in four of the five largest European countries as well as in the United States favored cuts in aid to developing countries as part of their fiscal restraint programs. The list was led by the United States at 70 percent approval, but only Italy, at 40 percent, was an exception (Barber 2010) . Political extremism is promoted by low economic growth rates, as documented by Brückner and Grüner (2010) , and political extremism frequently takes the form of antagonism toward foreigners and foreign institutions, including international institutions.
The central point is that in the aftermath of the 2007-09 global financial crisis and the associated increased distrust of governments, it will be increasingly difficult to mobilize public support for international action (climate change), international institutions (the IFIs), and reforms of the architecture of global economic governance.
The international financial institutions are at great risk. They are distant from the taxpayers who are asked to support them. This makes them easy to demonize because to most citizens, whether the institutions are providing financial support or policy advice to their countries, they are abstractions.
Public opinion in most Asian countries still holds "the IMF" to blame for the 1997-98 Asian financial crises even though the evidence points in the other direction. Most of the officials with whom I have talked in the intervening decade say in private that the IMF advised them to do the right things, but they are reluctant to say so in public. The vast majority of the actions that the IMF, and the multilateral development banks as well, "forced" upon the countries in the crises were not subsequently reversed when the governments had repaid the IMF. In Korea on July 12, 2010, managing director Strauss-Kahn (2010a)
acknowledged "we have made mistakes. But we have also learned from our experience during the Asian crisis." The next day, he argued (Strauss-Kahn 2010b) that "the extensive reforms undertaken over the past decade have been critical to protect Asia from the full brunt of the crisis."
The greater the length of the political rope attached to an international institution, the easier it is to find fault with some aspect of its operations and, in effect, hang the institution in the town square of public opinion. The challenges facing the international financial institutions are highlighted by the increased scrutiny they receive from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
NGOs are political entities designed to influence policies. NGOs come in many shapes and sizes.
Many are reputable and responsible, but some are not. Moreover, what amounts to responsible behavior is difficult to define. The standards used by citizens of the United States, Singapore, India, Malaysia, or
China to judge the activities of such entities differ widely. There are no national or international standards for NGOs. In the internet age, self-restraint by NGOs is rarely rewarded. Many stateless NGOs are 7. In the case of at least one of them, the Netherlands, where antipathy toward foreigners has increased substantially, one can wonder how long this tradition will last. Moreover, the Netherlands also is among the European countries that in the past have resisted changes in voting shares in the IMF because that country would lose prestige.
largely self-appointed in their missions, may be financially supported in large part by individuals external to the country or region where they are active or seek to represent, and tend to focus on single issues. In the process, they fuel clashes of political cultures.
The world has changed since the end of World War II, it has changed since the demise of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime, it has changed since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and it has changed in the decade since the Asian financial crises. Many of these changes have been in IFI governance and architecture: membership has expanded, the regional development banks have been created, missions have evolved, and governance structures have been adjusted-somewhat. However, international financial institutions change slowly.
It is useful to speculate on the reasons behind the slow pace of change of the IFIs. In the area of governance, gains and losses by individual countries are more clearly zero-sum at least as perceived by the governments, bureaucracies, and citizens of the member countries. Country A gains in votes, voice, and influence and country B loses. Country B generally does not internalize the gains it receives from being a member of a more responsive and representative institution that commands greater respect and has greater influence on the policies of each of its members. Country A also generally does not recognize the loss to its own sovereignty that comes with a stronger voice and vote and the associated greater responsibility for the institution as a whole and for success in its mission.
Third, and largely as a result of the first two phenomena, when international financial institutions and their members confront the opportunity or imperative for change, the direction and pace of change is a matter of dispute. Some member countries want to scale back or redirect and enhance certain activities, 13 eliminate some programs, or embark on new initiatives. Others want to institute reforms that threaten long-accepted ways of doing business. All this disagreement supports the interests of those who want to preserve the status quo and their status in the institution. This reinforces the institutional inertia and raises the stakes for the losers and winners.
the ArchItecture of globAl economIc governAnce
The architecture of global economic governance has two broad components: formal, established institutions and informal, ad hoc groups.
The established international, regional, and subregional economic and financial institutions face many challenges in responding to a changing global environment, but they have one advantage over the various ad hoc groups, such as the G-20, the G-7, G-8, G-10, and the CMI: legitimacy conveyed by formal political approval processes. The IFIs have formal charters that have been approved by national governments and parliaments or legislatures.
The ad hoc economic governance groups span a spectrum. They may be purely informal groups that exchange views on topics of common interest and, in some cases, coordinate positions on certain issues such as the G-5 in its early days, and Brazil, Russia, India, and the People's Republic of China (the BRICs) in their meetings today. 8. The various groups may meet at the level of leaders, ministers, or below ministers. The G-5 countries are France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; they first met at the ministerial level in 1973. The G-7 also includes Canada and Italy. The G-8 includes Russia. The G-10 consists of the G-7 countries plus Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland; Switzerland initially was not a member of the IMF in the early 1960s when the G-10 was formed and was an associate member until it joined the IMF in the early 1990s. The BRICs are Brazil, Russia, India, and the People's Republic of China. The Chiang Mai Initiative includes the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries plus three other countries: the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. The G-20 countries are the G-7, the BRICs, Indonesia (also a member of ASEAN), Australia and the Republic of Korea (the fifth and sixth Asian countries in the G-20), Argentina, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. At the ministerial level, an additional member of the European Union may participate if the EU presidency is not held by one of four EU members of the G-7, making 20 country representatives. At the leaders' level, the Netherlands and Spain have managed to be invited in addition to a number of representatives of other regions such as ASEAN and Africa.
9. The AMRO is a successor to the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue, which has been held twice a year at the deputies' level. It also builds on the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) established in the ASEAN secretariat in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian financial crises. See Henning (2009 and and Sussangkarn (2010). lend to each other through the IMF and a collective surveillance mechanism outside the IMF in the form of Working Party Three (WP3) of the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD. 10 However, these ad hoc groups are not full, formal institutions.
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The CMI and CMIM may be considered to be institutions at the subregional level, but their creation was essentially an ad hoc response to the Asian financial crises. So too was the case with the creation of the G-10 in response to pressures on the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the G-5/G-7 in response to the collapse of that system, to the creation of the Committee of Twenty on
Reform of the International Monetary System to put it back together, and to the oil crisis of 1973-74.
The Asian subregional architecture has not been entirely set as is demonstrated by discussions about inviting Australia, India, and New Zealand to participate in the CMI and by meetings of the ASEAN+3 with those countries in the East Asian summits.
The ASEAN countries alone account for 9.8 percent of Asian GDP at current exchange prices and exchange rates, and 15.4 percent of the population of Asia. Those figures increase to 80 percent and 54.9 percent respectively for the ASEAN+3 group of countries, and to 96.2 and 86.9 including Australia, India, and New Zealand. 12 The challenge for members of the CMI is not only how they define what some see as a nascent Asian Monetary Fund vis-à-vis the IMF but also how they define its role vis-à-vis the other 30 or so other Asian countries. The challenge for the Asian countries as a group, for example in the context of the ADB, is how to resolve the tension between Asian separateness and Asian leadership.
the future of the g-20
Over the past two years, the G-20 has evolved rapidly into an effective crisis management steering group for the global economy and financial system. At the same time, the G-20 has been criticized for being unrepresentative. Including the European Union as a whole, the G-20 represents 88 percent of global GDP (83 percent on a purchasing power parity [PPP]basis) and 65 percent of the world's population. 10. In 1983 the GAB was modified to permit the participants to decide to lend to the IMF to support economic programs for nonparticipants. In 1998, the NAB was established. It incorporated the commitments of the 11 G-10 countries to the GAB, which remains in existence, and added 14 new participants. Chile became a participant in 2002. As result of the G-20 agreement in April 2009 and a subsequent decision by the IMF executive board as described above, an additional 13 countries are expected to become participants, for a total of 26.
11. One could also consider specialized ad hoc groups, with limited memberships, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and the Financial Stability Board, the enlarged and expanded successor to the Financial Stability Forum, which has a broad mandate to coordinate and initiate activities with respect to the international financial system. See Schinasi and Truman (2010) .
12. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the figures for GDP for the three country groupings are 12.6, 75.5, and 94.3 percent respectively. From the standpoint of the G-20 countries and their leaders, the G-20 framework is a tempting and convenient framework to use to address an increasingly wide variety of global issues. This is the path that the G-5/G-6/G-7 took after its establishment first as an economic forum in the early 1970s. 15 On the one hand, the G-20 leaders and their governments should resist the temptation of mission creep because in doing so they would risk further undermining their legitimacy and authority. On the other hand, on many issues, ranging from climate change to world trade, the G-20 brings together the key, relevant countries and some issues cannot be resolved except at the leaders' level in the context of an action-forcing event such as a scheduled meeting.
14. See Chowdhury (2010) and Menon (2010) . The 3G group includes five Asian countries among its 27 members: Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Singapore.
15. On the history and evolution of these groups, see Meyer et al. (2002) , Sobel and Stedman (2006 ), and Truman (2004 , 2006c .
The test for the G-20 leaders is whether their decisions and initiatives are, and are perceived by others to be, in the mutual interest of the participants along with the common interest of the system as a whole.
A The IMF staff (2010d) quantified the potential benefits from collective action by the G-20 countries to achieve balanced, sustainable global growth: global real GDP would be higher by $1.6 trillion (2.5 percent) in 2015. The direct benefit to Asia would be about $250 billion, split roughly equally between Japan and emerging Asia. In the downside scenario, the loss in real GDP is estimated at $2.1 trillion for the world and $350 billion for Asia. Because of its potential for rapid growth, openness, and diversity, Asia has a great deal to gain from international cooperation and a lot to lose if it fails.
The IMF staff estimates did not quantify the consequences for Asia and the world of an increase in protectionism if the G-20 fails to achieve balanced global growth.
The leaders of the individual G-20 countries meeting in Seoul should state precise, new, numerical commitments in support of the goal of an economic recovery and subsequent expansion that broadly 17 benefit all stakeholders in the global system. If the leaders do no more than repeat broad statements about reducing budget deficits and public debt levels, implementing structural reforms, and allowing greater exchange rate flexibility, they will deserve the criticism they will and should receive. In this connection, the Asian countries are individually and collectively in the strongest position, but they also are highly vulnerable to another systemic disruption because of their substantial dependence on export-led growth (Eichengreen 2009 and Goldstein and Xie 2009) . They must take the lead with concrete changes in policies. For example, they should commit to numerical targets for their current account positions and announce specific measures to achieve those targets. The other G-20 countries should follow the Asian lead. For example, the United States should commit to reform its social security system by the end of 2011, which would help to address the US medium-term fiscal crisis, contribute to confidence, raise the US saving rate, and thereby contribute to limiting global current account imbalances.
With respect to form, Asia and the G-20 leaders not only should resist expanding their mandate but also should resist institutionalization. If they cannot resist institutionalization, that decidedly second-best option should involve several elements. Third, institutionalization of a secretariat should not be part of structural reform. The G-20 practice of using a troika of the past, present, and future chairs, which reportedly operates more informally at the leaders' level than at the ministerial level, provides enough continuity without burying the leaders with an agenda that in fact they do not address. The leaders should be free to address the issues of the moment that they regard as important rather than pretending to address issues that their ministers and staffs want to see on the agenda. For similar reasons, the G-20 should draw upon the expertise of the international economic and financial organizations and request inputs from them, but the role of the institutional representatives should be as observers, not as agenda setters.
the g-20 And the InternAtIonAl fInAncIAl InStItutIonS
Turning to the formal, established components of the architecture of global economic governance, the IFIs are in a state of flux. Unfortunately, crises are frequently necessary to bringing about real change, but what type of change? There is a demand for more rules to constrain the actions or inactions of other countries. There is a conflicting demand by the same countries for more discretion or optionality in their own policies. One way of responding to these demands is to provide more clarity about the IFIs and their objectives and structures as well as about how regional institutions (ad hoc as well as formal) mesh with global institutions and how subregional institutions mesh with regional institutions.
I favor one system for one world. The same fundamental rules, standards, and procedures should, in principle, apply to all countries. In practice, adjustments may need to be made for a country's stage of development, but those adjustments should be seen as deviations from the norm that applies to all. As a practical matter, countries also have different cultures and political systems and philosophies, but in most areas of economic and financial policy, those differences are not germane. All political systems tend to resist change, but the laws of economics (supply and demand and budget constraints) apply regardless.
The alternative to one system is diversity, or at least a reliance on subsidiarity. The advocates of diversity argue that distant decision makers and bureaucrats don't always get things right. The economic and financial performance of the system as a whole on average is therefore aided by decentralized decision making even if that structure produces what are agreed ex post to be negative externalities. This approach essentially argues against any form of international economic and financial policy coordination beyond information sharing. The advocates of subsidiarity argue that it conveys legitimacy on decision-making processes by bringing decisions closer to the citizens. The advocates of a common framework even if implementation is decentralized can point to the global economic and financial crisis. It affected countries differentially and, consequently differentiated responses were appropriate, but those responses were mindful of the global context. 16 . In this regard, I do not regard the United Nations as an economic or financial organization. We do not have global government, and the United Nations has had few accomplishments in the global economic and financial arena, nor was it established to do so. On this basis, I would not have favored including the United Nations in the Washington G-20 summit, but that die has now been cast.
The increased complexity and integration of national, regional, and global economies and financial systems point toward common rules and standards that apply to all countries, but many resist those trends much as they resist global integration itself. In many respects, Asia's diversity makes it a microcosm of the world as a whole. This can be an advantage or disadvantage to Asia. It is up to the leaders in Asia to turn Asia's diversity into an advantage.
As is well known, Asian leaders are struggling with how to balance what they see as the separateness of Asia, and a celebration of its successes over the past decade that sometimes borders on triumphalism, with Asia's high degree of integration with the global system. The example of Europe is often cited favorably in Asia with respect to integration, mutual support, common policies, and ultimately, perhaps, a common currency.
My reading of European economic and financial development over the past four decades is that
European leaders turned their attention inward more than was healthy for Europe. They tried to set up economic financial institutions that were entirely separate from global institutions such as the IMF. One adverse consequence was that the Europeans tended to worry more about the form of their involvement with the IMF, one of near dominance from about 1960 on-when they had recovered from World War II-than about the substance of the institution's work even as the world was changing. European nations opted for a different balance between external financial support and policy discipline and reform at the global and regional levels. At the global level, they tried to limit financing and emphasize rigorous policy conditions. At the regional level, starting in the mid-1970s, when a European country faced financial difficulties, it turned not to the IMF but to its European partners and a variety of European mechanisms over time that delivered financial assistance to member countries with few or weak policy conditions.
Europe applied a double standard to its partners. We have the opportunity to develop a financial safety net which involves both regional coinsurance and the IMF as global insurer. We are better off with both regional surveillance and IMF surveillance rather than one or the other. It will also enable us, when crises hit, to respond with the speed and magnitude that modern day crises need. The lessons of the past two years is about interconnectedness, no matter where a crisis starts . . . contagion is fast and furious.
A failure to learn this lesson can have systemic consequences. For example, the delays in Europe in turning to the Fund exacerbated negative effects on the crisis countries, on Europe as a whole, but also on the global economic and financial system. At the same time, engagement should be two-way as I discuss below.
The institutions of international finance can become ossified or out of date. When the charters of the institutions were drafted, the process was driven by those who held the power and the pen. and not in the regional development banks. This situation demonstrates that "nationality" as a criterion lies just below the surface as, perhaps, should be the case if the issue is representation rather than efficiency.
17. An additional reason advanced by Eichengreen (2009) is that the CMI and CMIM are untested mechanisms of mutual financial assistance. A decade after the CMI was first proposed, it was not even used during the 2008-09 phase of the recent crisis in part, some argue, because of the stigma associated with being the first country to use it.
The problem today is that the only way to demonstrate that the convention in selection of these heads has been abandoned is for the next IMF managing director not to be a European or the next president of the World Bank not to be a US citizen. I have no doubt that that will be the case, but the irony is that by insisting that the United States and Europe take the pledge in the form of agreeing that "nationality" should not be a factor in choosing the heads of these institutions, the proponents implicitly are violating their own principles by excluding some nationalities if their objective is efficiency or the best person for the position. Moreover, the political victory may be pyrrhic if they pursue it in Seoul. Doing so may make it more difficult to achieve agreement on other more important matters affecting these institutions.
The IFIs also face issues of accountability to the governments that are members of the institutions as well as to the general public. Compromises made when institutions were founded produce ambiguity qualify for the FCL and to whom actual lending would have to be accompanied by limited, streamlined conditions (ex post conditionality) on economic and financial policies; and (3) a multilateral lending facility, or global stabilization mechanism, through which, in a crisis, the IMF could offer financing to a group of countries with sound policies, either in a region or more broadly, that risk being affected by a regional or global crisis.
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These elements are useful additions to the IMF's lending tool kit as far as they go, but they should be embedded in a broader framework that would move the IMF even closer to a role as an international lender of last resort by systematically addressing the moral hazard dimension of this role in addition to the financial facility role. Central banks as lenders of last resort to financial institutions combine essentially unlimited access to funds with close supervision and regulation of the potential recipients of those funds.
The aim is to limit the potential for a financial institution to add excessive risk to its portfolio and then turn to the central bank for liquidity support in what amounts to a bailout when the institution is in fact insolvent or close to that condition.
To tie IMF lending more tightly to policy surveillance and supervision, I have for several years advocated in private conversations and presentations an approach to the IMF's role in crisis lending that combines the availability of different facilities to members in a range of possible circumstances with the IMF's role in bilateral, and potentially multilateral, surveillance: comprehensive prequalification.
Comprehensive prequalification would work as follows. Every member of the IMF is obligated to have an annual Article IV consultation and review of its economic and financial policies by the IMF staff and executive board. 20 As an integral part of these reviews in the future, the IMF staff would indicate on what policy terms every member country would be potentially eligible to borrow from the Fund. For the country with very strong fundamental policies and a track record of policy performance, the staff would state that the country would be eligible to borrow under the FCL. For the country with generally strong policies, the staff would state what changes in policies or policy commitments would be necessary to qualify it for lending under the PCL. For the country with weak policies or a weak track record, the staff would outline the changes in policies that would be necessary as part of a traditional stand-by arrangement (SBA).
This framework would apply to all countries, and the recommendations should take into account changing global economic and financial circumstances. The IMF executive board could comment on the 19. These proposals were sketched out in IMF 2010a in which the multilateral lending facility is described as a multicountry swap facility, building on the concept of the swap arrangements provided by the Federal Reserve System and other central banks to a more limited degree during the 2008-10 phase of the crisis. On August 30, the IMF issued a press release (10/321) announcing the executive board's approval of the first two elements and continued discussion of the global stability mechanism (www.imf.org accessed August 31, 2010). See also IMF 2010b and 2010c.
20. For some smaller members the reviews are on an 18-month cycle.
staff recommendation, as it now does on the staff policy assessment, but the board would not be required to act on it. Implementation of the approach should be supported by a commitment to make these staff reports public promptly and without significant modification. Under this framework, it would also be necessary to link the Article IV consultations more closely to financial sector assessments and to the work of the FSB, which is desirable in any case as argued by Schinasi and Truman (2010) .
For example, the staff report on the US Article IV consultation might state that in the staff's judgment the United States would only be eligible for a PCL, not an FCL, and a PCL would be subject to policy conditions with respect to a longer-term fiscal plan to place public debt on a sustainable path, further concrete actions to control healthcare costs, and implementation of planned and additional financial sector reforms. Each of these topics was covered in the staff report for the US Article IV consultation (IMF 2010e). What would be necessary would be to make those recommendations more concrete and link them to a judgment about where US policies put the United States and the spectrum from FCL to PCL to SBA.
The multilateral consultation process would be introduced into the proposed framework via assessments of the global economic and financial environment. These assessments could lead to a staff recommendation with respect to support for a group of countries as with the multilateral lending facility or global stability mechanism.
The comprehensive prequalification approach as a whole should help to reduce the stigma problem of borrowing from the IMF. Countries would be responding to what in effect would be an invitation from the IMF staff to borrow on specific terms. (1) The mechanism would temporarily augment the IMF's financial resources and help to centralize this type of lending in the IMF. At the height of the recent crisis, this type of support amounted to more than $600 billion. 22 It was provided via the swap lines of the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank.
(2) The mechanism would permit the issuing central banks to use the SDR to obtain foreign currencies if they need them to offset exchange rate pressures resulting from the liquidity support operations. (3) The mechanism would enhance the role of the SDR and hopefully limit somewhat the precautionary demand for increases in international reserves.
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IMF reform is about striking a better balance: a better balance between adjustment and financing, a better balance between borrowed and quota-based funds, and a better balance on the IMF executive board. Most observers agree that at present representation on the IMF executive board is skewed excessively toward Europe, which potentially occupies 10 of the 24 seats on the IMF executive board.
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Thus, Europe potentially provides more than 40 percent of the voices on an executive board that reaches decisions by consensus, where voices count, with only about 30 percent of global GDP at market prices.
22. It is not necessary or desirable to provide the IMF with permanent resources to do this type of lending, which is inherently temporary but substantial.
I first made this proposal in Truman (2008).
24. EU countries control six seats directly and are significant or dominant members of the constituencies associated with three other seats. Switzerland dominates another constituency, which also includes a major member of the IMF: Poland.
The current structure of the IMF executive board reflects history and a distribution of voting power that is skewed by history and does not reflect current and prospective economic and financial balance in the world. After many years of stonewalling by the Europeans, the salience of this issue on the IMF reform agenda was recently enhanced by the US decision not to support a continuation of a 24-member executive board until the Europeans agreed to reduce their representation. 25 This matter is expected to be resolved before the G-20 meets in Seoul.
The 
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The size of the executive board also should be returned to 20 seats to increase its efficiency and to save money by reducing the embarrassingly large share of the administrative expenses-almost 10 percent as of 2006-that is devoted to servicing the current governance structure (Crockett Report 2007). However, this is less important than the issue of improving the allocation of chairs on the executive board.
One hears a number of self-serving arguments on this topic. For example, it is said that European executive directors provide a high level of service to the non-European members of their constituencies.
This argument sounds a bit like colonialism. Another argument is that if the executive board were shrunk to 20 seats, the four constituencies with the smallest number of votes would be at risk, those now headed by Brazil, India, Argentina, and Rwanda. This argument ignores the potential for increasing the voting power of these constituencies. More important, this argument ignores the fact that the distribution of executive board constituencies has always involved a prevote negotiation, in which the number of candidates matches the number of open seats. This is necessary to ensure that every member of the IMF is represented on the executive board. The Europeans have an obligation to negotiate in good faith on the upcoming election.
25. The IMF Articles of Agreement authorize a 20-member executive board and its size can only be altered by an 85 percent majority vote. Over the past several decades, such votes have been held every two years in connection with the biennial elections of IMF executive directors. In 2010, the United States, with more than 16 percent of weighted votes, declined to vote for this decision.
26. The objective should be one seat for the members of the eurozone, one seat for nonmembers of the eurozone, and possibly one seat for European nonmembers of the European Community. It would also be desirable to amend the IMF Articles of Agreement so that all executive directors are elected. The major challenge is that the 2008 quota formula essentially points in the wrong direction. The flaws in the formula are many (Bryant 2010 , Cooper and Truman 2007 , and Truman 2008 . One is that to include as a so-called openness variable gross current account transactions merely reinforces measures of economic size; if included at all, the variable should be scaled by GDP. A second flaw is that transactions among participants in economic unions should be excluded. Another is that the variable for the variability of international transactions also should be scaled by GDP. And fourth, there is no rationale behind introducing a compression factor other than arbitrarily to redistribute the results of the formula itself; It reintroduces non-linearity into the formula to achieve an arbitrary result. Other flaws could be added to this list.
As can be seen by comparing the first and second columns in table 1, if the 2008 quota formula were to be the sole basis for distributing quota shares and that shift was implemented entirely at this time, the result would be a shift of only 2.1 percentage points in combined quota share from the traditional advanced countries to the rest of the membership of the IMF and a reduction in the quota share of the European Union, commonly viewed as the most overrepresented group of countries, by only half a percentage point; see first memorandum item. 28. See Bryant (2010) and Truman (2006a Truman ( , 2006b Truman ( , and 2008 .
29. I use the phrase "traditional advanced countries" to exclude Korea and Singapore, which are now classified by the IMF as "advanced countries" except in the context of quota share discussions. Those two countries are not included in the advanced-advanced country group in table 1.
From the second memorandum item, one can see that a plausible set of 23 potential "dynamic emerging-market and developing countries" would have their quota share boosted by 6.3 percentage points by the new formula. 30 However, this observation points to a problem: Contortions would be required to get from the first column to the second column while satisfying all the other constraints. The objective is not just to pick winners, to pick losers, and to pick those countries whose relative positions are to be unchanged, but to reach a result transparently and at the same time to produce a doubling of IMF quota shares in which each member receives some increase in its quota.
To illustrate these issues, assume a division of the IMF's members into three groups of countries with equal one-third shares of total quotas after the 2008 adjustments are implemented: One group whose individual quota shares on average and combined quota share should increase by 5 percentage points; a second group whose quotas should increase but whose individual quota shares on average and combined quota shares should be unchanged; and a third group whose quotas would be unchanged but whose combined share would decline by 5 percentage points. Under this scenario, the distributional constraints could be satisfied with an overall increase in quotas of 17.6 percent and the same for the middle group on average.
This scenario would fail to satisfy the objective of facilitating a large overall increase in IMF quotas to restore it to a quota-based organization and also to give every member an increase in its quota. On the same assumptions as in the above example, a doubling of total quotas, and the quotas of the middle group, would allow for a 70 percent increase in the quotas of the third group, along with a 130 percent increase in the quotas of the first group. This result is more reasonable and plausible, but it is not clear how IMF members would reach this result as part of a process of transparent, rational decision making using only the 2008 quota formula. 31. The World Bank (2010), unconstrained by a formula other than that dictated by the current distribution of voting shares, arrived at the G-20-agreed objective of at least a 3 percentage point shift in voting shares to developing and transition members via a combination of measures of economic weight, adjustments to those measures of economic weight, thresholds and limits, boosters of various types, forbearance, and dilutions. The contortions were an exercise in nontransparency. A promise was made that these ingredients would later be transformed into a new formula for the Bank, but one can be skeptical that this will be achieved. Table 1 demonstrates how such an approach would work, based upon the illustrative quota formula advanced by Bryant (2010) and updated using data released by the IMF on June 10, 2010. 32 The results presented in table 1 The proposed approach summarized in table 1 has the following positive features:
First, every member of the IMF receives an increase in its quota.
Second, the approach achieves an immediate shift of 3.2 percentage points in quota shares between the traditional advanced countries to the other members of the Fund.
Third, focusing on the illustrative group of dynamic and emerging-market and developing economies, it achieves a shift toward them of 4.3 percentage points.
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Fourth, the combined quota share of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT)-eligible countries (a proxy for the poorest members) would be increased slightly by 0.35 percentage points as a 32. The revised calculations using the new data were performed by Ralph Bryant for which I am very grateful. Summarizing the illustrative Bryant formula, it would raise the weight on the global share of GDP at market prices and exchange rates from 30 percent in the 2008 formula to 31 percent, raise the weight on the global share of GDP on a PPP basis from 20 to 31 percent (providing parity), reduce the weight on the global share of unscaled current account transactions from 30 to 5 percent, reduce the weight on the global share of unscaled variability from 15 to 10 percent, reduce the weight on the global share of international reserves from 5 to 3 percent, introduce with a weight of 5 percent a "ratio share" for openness equal to the ratio of the unscaled current account transactions variable to GDP to the sum of the ratios for all countries, introduce with a weight of 3 percent a similar "ratio share" variable for variability, and introduce with a weight of 12 percent a new population variable (as of 2008 from World Development Indicators). Bryant (2010) provides a spirited defense of his use of the population variable. The illustrative Bryant formula also does not include the arbitrary compression factor that is part of the 2008 formula.
33. In IMF parlance, this approach would not involve an equiproportional increase in quotas (based on current quotas) or an ad hoc increase in quotas of certain members based on special criteria. Rather all the increase would be based on a double-barreled selective increase in quotas in which one barrel would be the 2008 formula and the second barrel the illustrative Bryant formula. Turning from IMF governance back to substance, as discussed above in connection with the G-20 framework for balanced, strong, sustainable growth, a major challenge in the evolution of the global economy going forward is meeting the demands of countries for self-insurance via increases in their international reserves and the associated preference for current account surpluses achieved via currency 35 . The voting share of this group of countries would be increased slightly less as their share in basic votes, the other component of voting shares, would remain unchanged.
36. A substantial part of the reason why the illustrative Bryant formula points in the "right" direction for this group of countries is the inclusion of the population variable with a 12 percent weight, but even without any weight on that variable the share of this group of countries would still point to a rise of 5.83 percent because of the role of the two ratio share variables for openness and variability. These countries' shares of these variables in the totals are 36.4 and 50.3 percent respectively.
undervaluation. This form of self-insurance tends to be costly to the individual countries as well as globally inefficient as it distorts the adjustment process.
One should be clear about the policy assumptions about the global economic system that give rise to such distortions of the adjustment process. First, they are the result of the presumed desire by some countries for ever increasing stocks of international reserves. Not all countries fall in this category.
Excluding Japan, the stock of nongold reserves of the traditional advanced countries increased only There are three problems with this solution: First, the division between the two groups would be arbitrary: the Republic of Korea and Singapore are now treated in most IMF statistical contexts as advanced countries, and they arguably would not want to be in that group. Second, it is doubtful that the basic mismatch problem would be much improved in any case. Going further would tip the proposal in the direction of an SDR-aid link, which is anathema to many. Third, basing SDR allocations on revealed preference for demand for reserves would undermine the adjustment process.
It would be better to build on the proposal of Olivier Jeanne (2010) . He suggests that the IMF request each member to provide a cost-benefit analysis of the appropriate level and, implicitly, the change 37. The increase was 59 percent including Japan.
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in its precautionary international reserves as part of its Article IV consultations. Initially these targets, individually and collectively, would be analyzed and evaluated over time. Reserve accumulations are sometimes related to capital inflows, which pose macroeconomic problems for a number of countries. Inflows feed reserve accumulations via the countries' resistance of upward pressure on exchange rates, and reserves also may be accumulated against the day when capital inflows reverse. We have an issue of causality, and it is difficult to generalize across countries.
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The consensus on international capital flows and capital controls has evolved over the past decade in the direction of greater concern about the impacts of inflows and greater tolerance for trying to control or influence them via policies. See Ostry et al. (2010) .
There is an open question about how much policy space there is to impose capital controls, but that is an empirical question.
The possibility of amending the IMF Articles of Agreement as they apply to capital flows and capital controls was dropped in the late 1990s and should be reconsidered. The G-20 meeting in Seoul could kick-start this process, perhaps by mandating a special working group drawn from interested members with an explicit timetable. 39 The process should start with a full-fledged examination to see if there is enough common agreement.
If there were sufficient agreement, the amendment should state the long-term goal of complete freedom of capital movements among countries, along with appropriate prudential regulations internally and globally. But there should be no timetable explicit or implicit to achieve this goal.
The amendment should guide national policies in terms of both the rights and the responsibilities of IMF members. For example, controls should be permitted. However, as much as possible, they should be applied on a nondiscriminatory, national treatment basis.
The amendment should describe and prescribe the role of the IMF management, staff, and members in conducting surveillance over capital flows and controls. The principal rationale for collective action is that both capital flows and capital controls generate externalities.
It would be worth considering whether the IMF should be empowered formally to "bless" capital controls (and whether such a power to bless would be ex ante or ex post) or merely to tolerate and provide advice about them. However, the amendment should remove the present anachronistic asymmetry in 38. Eichengreen (2009) anticipates a diminished pace of capital flows as financial regulation is tightened in the wake of the 2007-10 global economic and financial crisis, but the evidence to date does not support his view.
39. This material is adapted from Truman (2010a) .
Article VI between current account transactions and capital account transactions and the use and nonuse of IMF resources to finance each type of transaction.
Reform in this area should not be separated from other desirable reforms of the international monetary and financial systems. In particular, IMF surveillance on this topic should be explicitly strengthened and extended covering the full range of policies of recipient countries that affect private and official capital inflows and outflows, which will be very intrusive. Importantly, and more controversially,
IMF surveillance on this topic should be explicitly extended to the full range of policies of source countries that affect capital inflows and outflows, including monetary policies.
The G-20 leaders should embrace a forward-looking work program on capital flows. The topic should be of particular interest to many of the emerging-market countries that are members of the G-20. The quid pro quo would be a commitment by those countries to implement conscientiously the agreements and understandings that will be blessed in Seoul on international financial reform, again, in the interest of a single set of standards for the global financial system.
concludIng obServAtIonS
The G-20 summit in Seoul is an opportunity and a challenge for Asian and G-20 leaders. The test will be whether they can demonstrate that the G-20 can responsibly advance an agenda in the interests of the global economic and financial system as a whole. In this paper, I have made a number of specific recommendations.
The first principal recommendation is that the G-20 leaders deliver concrete policy actions as part of the mutual assessment process supporting the G-20 goal of strong, sustained balanced global growth. In this area, Asian leaders have a special opportunity to demonstrate their responsibility and commitment to the system as a whole, which would also benefit Asia.
The second principal set of recommendations is to strengthen the IMF and its role in the international economic and financial system. To this end, the G-20 should agree to a substantial expansion of the role of the IMF as an international lender of last resort by creating a better global financial safety net. That mechanism should be embedded in a framework of comprehensive prequalification of IMF members for financial assistance. This would strengthen the IMF surveillance role and help to address moral hazard concerns. The G-20 leaders also should agree to double the IMF's quota resources to support the Fund's enhanced emergency financing role. With respect to IMF governance, the G-20 leaders should agree to applaud the reduction in European representation on the IMF executive board and they should adopt a transparent approach to delivering on their prior commitment to redistribute 5 percentage points of IMF quota shares such as the one I have advanced. 
